Abstract: Some rational decision theorists argue that moral considerations would introduce inefficiency to investment decisions. However, market demand for socially responsible investment is increasing. We test the suitability of (a) multiple attribute utility theory, (b) theory of planned behavior, and (c) issue-contingent model of ethical decision making in organizations to explain socially responsible investment behavior. In an experimental setting, 141 participants traded company shares on a computerized asset market. Over 12 periods, companies varied in morality and in profitability.
investment decisions
Money and morals do not always mix well. Socially responsible investment promises to bridge the apparent gap between making profit and still having a clean consciousness.
But should homo oeconomicus care about moral issues? In particular, should he or she exclude certain alternatives for the sake of morality? Rational decision theorists would probably answer to the negative, arguing that restricting the options would introduce inefficiency. In the market, however, a growing interest for socially responsible investment can be noticed. How could this interest be explained? Using an experimental setting with strictly controlled profits, the current paper investigates three different theoretical models for their potential to explain moral investment behavior.
Moral decision making
Moral decision making is a choice between "good" and "evil" options. The morality of options depends on a system of rules generated by the culture of a given society. A philosophical concept of such rules that allows implementing moral considerations into economic theory is utilitarianism (Baron, 2000) . It assumes that moral behavior is characterized by the idea of always doing what maximizes aggregated utility of all individuals concerned. Thus individuals' decisions concern the maximization of utility across people independent from their individualistic short term benefits. Other philosophical concepts are deontological rules, i.e. rules of duty and obligation independent from individual utility (e.g., Kant, 1959) . Some deontological concepts are so-called rights theories (e.g., Rawls, 1971) . These theories see rights as a consequence of a moral rule about what should be done or should not be done in a specific situation.
Rules generate rights as well as a duties; for example, the rule "do not murder" implies the right to live, (i.e., not to be murdered), as well as the duty not to murder. Thus, moral decision making is decision making governed by certain rules currently in force in a given society. Consideration of such rules can change behavior. The impact of morality was investigated in different contexts, such as business (e.g., Geva, 2000; Weber, 1996) , child development (e.g., Langford, 1992; Thoma & Rest, 1999) and education (e.g., Wainryb & Turiel, 1993) .
Several theoretical models can be applied to explain moral behavior. In the current paper, three such models are compared: (a) multiple attribute utility theory, (b) theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985) , and (c) issue-contingent model of ethical decision making in organizations (Jones, 1991) .
Multiple attribute utility theory (MAUT) is based on assumptions of a rational decision maker, and is suited to incorporate moral considerations (Baron, 2000) . It is assumed that, when assessing different alternatives, homo oeconomicus values the alternative with the highest utility most. In multiple attribute utility theory, utility is separated into attributes. For each alternative the utility (MAU) is determined by the sum over the utility of each attribute (u i ) multiplied by the weight of importance of the attribute (w i ) (Equation 1). Because of the separation of attributes, multiple attribute utility theory represents a theoretical background for a practical method to measure utility also from a moral perspective (Baron, 2000) . Morality is one attribute among others; its utility would be weighted by its importance.
Multiple attribute utility theory was already applied to study several decision problems concerning moral issues, e.g., environmental planning (Kim, Kwak, & Yoo 1998; Kwak, Yoo & Kim, 2001) or health related matters (Chapman, Elstein, Kuzel, Nadler, Sharifi & Bennett, 1999; Kasubek & Aschenbrenner, 1978) . These studies corroborate that multiple attribute utility theory is suitable to include moral considerations into decision making.
The theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985 (Ajzen, , 1991 ) is a social psychological concept for predicting human behavior. It is based on the earlier theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) . The theory of planned behavior postulates that a person's intention to perform a behavior is the immediate determinant of that behavior. Intention, in turn, is a function of three factors: Attitude toward the behavior, subjective norm and perceived behavioral control ( Figure 1 ). Attitude toward the behavior is a result of individual positive and negative evaluations of performing the behavior; subjective norm is the social pressure to perform the behavior. Perceived behavioral control is the subjective belief about being able to perform the behavior, and depends on earlier experiences and expected obstructions. It represents the factor by which the theory of reasoned action was extended.
[ Figure 1 about here]
The theory of planned behavior was often supported and was also used to explain moral behavior. The theory was applied to such behaviors as environmental friendliness (Bamberg, Rolle & Weber, 2003; Montalvo-Corral, 2002) , health promotion (Schifter & Ajzen, 1985) or tax compliance (Bobek & Hatfield, 2003) . It was also applied to investment behavior (East, 1993) , and once directly to socially responsible investment behavior (Borrello, Morricone, Pedon & Benevene, 2004) .
The issue-contingent model of ethical decision making in organizations (Jones, 1991 factors and socialization process) represent the environment in which the decision takes place and therefore influence the decision process solely in the last two stages ( Figure   2 ). In a review on ethical decision making in business, Loe, Ferrell and Mansfield (2000, p. 186) claim that "the Jones model (1991) provides the most comprehensive synthesis model of ethical decision making."
[ Figure 2 about here]
The issue-contingent model was applied to ethical business decisions such as environmental pollution (Flannery & May, 2000; May & Pauli, 2002) , product safety (May & Pauli, 2002; Weber, 1996) and fraud (Carlson, Kacmar & Wadsworth, 2002; Weber, 1996) . According to these studies, moral intensity determines the factors "recognize moral issue" and "make a moral judgment"; it is weakly supported that it also influences the factor "establish moral intent". These studies only focused on parts of the issue-contingent model of ethical decision making in organizations. To our knowledge, neither the model as a whole has been tested nor May and Pauli's (2002) demand to link moral intensity to actual moral behavior has been followed.
In the current paper, we test the suitability of these three models -multiple attribute utility theory, theory of planned behavior and issue-contingent model of ethical decision making in organizations -to explain moral behavior in the specific case of socially responsible investment behavior.
Socially responsible investment
Socially responsible investment, also termed ethical investment or sustainable investment, has become a considerable factor in finance. Socially responsible investment means, on the one hand, investing in companies or funds that guarantee compliance to certain positive ethical criteria. On the other hand, it means deliberately not investing in companies and funds according to certain negative ethical criteria (Lewis, Webley, Winnett & Mackenzie, 1998) . Examples for positive ethical criteria are environmental protection and fair trade with the Third World; examples for negative ethical criteria are nuclear power, human rights violations, and so-called 'sin stocks', i.e., shares of companies involved in the tobacco, alcohol or gambling industry (Anand & Cowton, 1993) .
According to rational decision theorists, investment decisions are made rationally and selfishly, because moral considerations would introduce inefficiency by reducing the number of investment options (Carswell, 2002; Michelson, Wailes, van der Laan & Frost, 2004) . Therefore in line with portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952a (Markowitz, , 1952b , moral considerations would increase either risk or reduce profitability of the portfolio and make it less efficient than conventional portfolios. Following this logic, only financial considerations should govern investment decisions. However, the increasing market demand for socially responsible investment indicates that investment decisions are influenced not only by financial benefits but also by additional factors, such as attitude and moral considerations.
Existing studies on socially responsible investment focused on sociodemographic variables (e.g., Gallup, 2000) or on investors' motives (e.g., Hofmann, Penz & Kirchler, 2004 , Lewis, 2001 Lewis & Mackenzie, 2000; Sparkes & Cowton, 2004 ) using surveys or interviews. In a rare experimental study (Webley, Lewis & Mackenzie, 2001) , 56 socially responsible and conventional investors gave the composition of their real portfolio (percentage of investment in ethical unit trusts, ordinary unit trusts, saving accounts, etc.) and changed this portfolio virtually reacting to eight fictitious scenarios differing in profitability and stock market changes. In another experimental study (Lewis & Webley, 1994) , 84 undergraduate students invested inherited money in five fictitious trusts, which included a socially responsible trust. Results revealed that a high performance of the ethical trust as well as participants' positive green attitudes 1 influenced the amount of money which was invested in the ethical trust.
It is the aim of the current study to answer three research questions. As on the one hand some economists argue that financial decisions should be made without restricting the options to socially responsible shares, and on the other hand the market for responsible investment is steadily increasing, question (1) is whether morality has an influence on investment decisions? If morality influences investment decisions, (2) can this influence be explained by the three decision models under consideration, i.e., multiple attribute utility theory, the theory of planned behavior and the issue-contingent model of ethical decision making? Finally, if decision models can explain the influence, (3) which model can explain the influence of morality in investment behavior best? Subsequently these questions will be answered by means of a questionnaire and a computerized asset market.
Method

Material and procedure
Participants were recruited either personally or via e-mail. They were informed that they would take part in an experiment on investment behavior lasting two hours for which they would receive 5 EUR (6.04 USD) as compensation for their time. In addition they would have the chance, according to their performance in the experiment, to win a book voucher worth 50 EUR (60.41 USD). When they agreed to take part in the experiment, they were given a questionnaire, which they had to complete and return before the computerized asset market.
The questionnaire consisted of 86 items and took 20 minutes to complete. First, the participants read a description of a company. They were asked to imagine that they had inherited a number of shares of that company as well as a certain amount of money that they could use to buy more shares of the company. Each person read four company descriptions. Two companies were described as personnel-promoting: Company A featured projects for older employees, company B had the explicit goal of equal promotion prospects for all employees. Two companies were described as personnel- for company shares, and to accept existing bids and asks of other participants. As soon as all participants understood the rules and were able to employ them, the experiment started. Over 12 periods, participants successively traded shares of the companies A, B, C and D, each company described exactly as in the questionnaire.
Only shares of one company were traded during each period. Again, the sequence in which company shares were traded was balanced over groups (
In each period, the company promised either low, medium or high expected values of dividends. Every period participants were informed which share was going to be traded and which dividend was to be expected in the forthcoming period.
On the information screen the participants were presented with five different possible dividends, each occurring with 20% probability. When a low profit had to be expected, possible dividends of 0, 1, 3, 5 and 6 experimental currency units (expected value = 3)
were displayed; at a medium expected profit, 0, 39, 41, 53 and 67 experimental currency units (expected value = 40) were displayed; and at a high expected profit, 0, 74, 82, 118
and 126 experimental currency units (expected value = 80) were displayed. The dividend actually distributed in each period was randomly determined from the dividends displayed . The sequence of the amount of expected values of dividends was the same for all companies: In the first period when shares of a certain company were traded, a medium dividend had to be expected, in the second period a high dividend and in the third period a low dividend. After each period participants were informed about their earnings in that period and then received information concerning the following period. After the 12 th period the profit earned over the entire computerized asset market was displayed, and the lottery for the book voucher was conducted. According to the amount of earned profit the participants received probability points. The more points a participant held compared to the other 13 participants, the higher was his or her chance to win the book voucher. All participants were paid 5 EUR (6.04 USD) in cash.
Participants
Overall, 141 persons, 86 females and 55 males with an average age of 25 years (M=24.74, SD=4.12), took part in the study. Participants were mainly undergraduate and graduate students of the University of Vienna and of the Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration. Twenty-seven participants invested in shares;
13 of these 27 specifically invested in socially responsible shares. Forty-five participants were members or donators of at least one charity.
Results
For the statistical analysis, data from the questionnaire were matched with the bids and asks from the computerized asset market via a personalized code. Although 12 sessions with 14 participants each were conducted, for two reasons the data of 27 participants could not be included in the analysis. First, some personalized codes on the questionnaire did not correspond to those from the asset market, so that the data could not be matched; second, some participants did not complete all questionnaire items needed for the analyses of the decision models. Thus, data from 141 participants remained for analysis. The manipulation check confirmed the effectivity of the operationalization. Personnel-promoting companies were perceived as behaving morally (company A: M=6.27, SD=1.31; company B: M=6.06, SD=1.31), while personnelneglecting companies were perceived as not behaving morally(company C: M=1.63, SD=1.20; company D: M=2.18, SD=1.51). Initial analyses were conducted on the reliability of the components of the decision models (Table 1) . The scales attitude, subjective norm and moral judgment hold very good reliability (minimal Cronbach-α = .74, maximal α = .90); however, the scales control (minimal α = .29, maximal α =.40) and moral intensity (minimal α = .61, maximal α = .73) maintain less satisfying reliability. It is assumed that the disappointing reliability of the scale control emerges 12 from ceiling effects which are due to the experimental approach of the study.
4
The scale moral intensity is reduced by the item for social consensus which measures moral intensity depending on how moral the companies are perceived, while the other five items of the scale are independent of moral perception. The exclusion of social consensus increases the reliability of moral intensity, especially for the personnelneglecting companies (minimal α = .74, maximal α = .77). According to the theoretical background the scale attribute utility is generated by a multiplication of the items utility and weight of importance for each company.
[ Table 1 about here]
Participants' bidding behavior was recorded in the computerized asset market. Bids and asks of participants were collected in all periods. Overall, 5337 bids were recorded.
From these bids, 3593 were accepted by other participants and led to a trade.
Additionally, 4590 asks were recorded. From these asks, 3090 were accepted by other participants and led to a trade. Descriptives are shown in Table 2 .
[ Table 2 about here]
Trades in the asset market provide valuable information on investment behavior, because they directly reflect exchange of money for shares. However, within a group, trades by individual participants are dependent: What one person sells is bought by another. In a first step, we therefore used the group as the unit of analysis and looked at the average trading price in each period. Table 3 shows descriptives. Statistics for the 4 In the experiment participants were in charge of the investment decision. As experimental money was
given to them and they learned about the market mechanism, they believed that they were able to sell and buy shares in the experiment and completed the questions on control by marking 6 on the six-point-scale.
general linear model for repeated measures show that the average trading price is influenced by profitability, F(2, 22) = 31.163, p < .001. Furthermore, it is influenced by morality of companies, i.e., whether they promote or neglect personnel, F(1, 11) = 15.079, p = .003. However, the specific content of their personnel policy, i.e., whether it concerns older employees or equal opportunities, did no influence trading prices, F(1, 11) = 1.833, p = .203. Because of this and similar findings on the individual level, data were pooled within companies A and B, which were perceived as behaving morally, and within companies C and D, which were perceived as not behaving morally. On the aggregate level of trading prices within each period, both profit and morality seem to influence valuation of the shares traded.
[ (df = 5) = 178.41, p < .001 (see Table 4 ).
According to the coefficients, morality of companies -compared to non-moralityincreases bids and asks by 5.58 experimental currency units. Low expected profitability compared to medium profitability decreases bids and asks by 18.61 experimental currency units; high expected profitability compared to medium expected profitability increases them by 17.16 experimental currency units.
6
Both on the aggregate level (average trading prices) and on the individual level (bids and asks), the results clearly indicate that participants reacted to both the expected profit of the shares and the company description as personnel-promoting or personnel-neglecting. Given that the expected dividend was experimentally controlled, these findings show that participants were sensitive to the context in which the profit would be made: they were willing to pay more for shares from a company described as moral than for shares from a company described as not being moral, holding profit constant.
[ Table 4 about here] 5 The variable ethicalness is dichotomous and features 1 for the personnel-promoting companies A and B and 0 for the personnel-neglecting companies C and D. The variables low and high profit are dichotomous. The variable low profit features 1 for periods in which the expected dividend was low, and 0 in all other periods. The variable high profit features 1 for periods in which the expected dividend was high, and 0 in all other periods. 6 Interactions between ethicalness and profitability did not have significant influence on bidding behavior, and consequently were not taken into account in later analyses.
The second research question was whether the influence of morality can be explained by decision models. The dependent variable again is bidding behavior, and low and high profitability again are included as predictors. Additional predictors vary according to the model under study. (a) For multiple attribute utility theory, the predictor attribute utility is included. Statistics show that the overall model is significant, Chi 2 (df = 3) = 166.34, p < .001, and that the parameter for attribute utility is significant.
Each single unit of attribute utility increases the bids and asks by 0.23 experimental currency units (see Table 5 ). These results indicate that the combination of subjective utility of morality and the subjective importance of morality can explain why participants would bid higher for shares from a personnel-promoting company.
[ Table 5 about here] experimental currency units (see Table 6 ). Second, intention is the dependent variable, and the predictors to form intention are attitude, subjective norm and control. Results
show that the overall model is significant, R Table 7 [ Table 7 about here]
The third research question concerned the comparison between models in their explanatory power of bidding behavior. This comparison was performed through estimation of Bayesian information criterions (BIC'; Raftery, 1996) . In the test between multiple attribute utility theory and the theory of planned behavior, the difference between the Bayesian information criterions of the theory of planned behavior 
Discussion
The results of the present study show that morality of companies has an effect on the price participants were willing to pay for shares. Although profit was experimentally controlled, participants paid more for shares from companies described as personnelpromoting. This pattern held both on the aggregate level of trades completed within a group in a certain period and on the individual level of bids and asks.
Three different theoretical models -multiple attribute utility theory, theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985 (Ajzen, , 1991 and issue-contingent model of ethical decision making in organizations (Jones, 1991 ) -were applied to explain these effects. Results indicate that all three models can explain variations in bidding behavior; the comparison between the models shows that multiple attribute utility theory fits best. Specific results show that investment behavior is influenced by participants' utility of morality, by intention to invest and by moral intensity of the investment -over and above profitability. These results corroborate and extend other studies on moral decision making. For utility and moral behavior, Kim, Kwak & Yoo (1998) and Kwak, Yoo & Kim (2001) found that multiple attribute utility theory can describe utility of environmental issues, but did not concern actual moral behavior. For intention and moral behavior, East (1993) showed that intention influences investment behavior, but socially responsible investment behavior in particular was not studied. Regarding moral intensity, existing studies (Carlson, Kacmar & Wadsworth, 2002; Flannery & May, 2000; May & Pauli, 2002; Weber, 1996) did not concern moral behavior, but remained on the level of intentions.
Theoretical implications
Although multiple attribute utility theory describes investment behavior best, and although it is economical with few variables, this model misses a crucial feature: It cannot explain how the factor morality is constituted and does not provide insight into the decision process. On the contrary, the theory of planned behavior describes the decision process where attitude towards behavior, subjective norm and perceived behavioral control determine intention, which in turn affects behavior. Current results
show that attitude toward behavior and subjective norm predict intention.
The issue-contingent model of ethical decision making in organizations also describes the decision process, but it is highly complex and contains five different, interrelated factors. The factors influence each others directly as well as via third factors, making it more difficult to test the model. The results from the initial analyses as well as the model test indicate that some components of the model need to be refined. In particular, the subordinate factor social consensus does not correlate with the other subordinate factors of moral intensity (see also May & Pauli, 2002) . While social consensus depends on the perceived morality of the issue, the other subordinate factors picture the moral issue independent whether it is perceived moral or amoral. Therefore, social consensus seems to be a factor of its own to influence the decision making process.
Furthermore, results indicate that subjective norm is an important predictor, but subjective norm is not incorporated in the issue-contingent model of ethical decision making in organizations. Although this model sees social consensus, which could be understood as a synonym of subjective norm, as an influence factor, social consensus and subjective norm do not have the same meaning. While social consensus (Jones, 1991) is the agreement or disagreement, respectively, of the society with the moral issue, subjective norm (Ajzen, 1985 (Ajzen, , 1991 means the agreement or disagreement of significant others with the behavior and the urge to follow the wishes of these significant others. Thus, the factor subjective norm should be incorporated in the issuecontingent model of ethical decision making in organizations, probably by reconsidering the factor social consensus.
Practical implications
The findings of the present study can practically be applied in marketing for socially responsible funds and shares. According to the results, marketing strategies should take into account the profit investors can realize. Although some investors might consider socially responsible investment a kind of donation (Hofmann et al., 2004) , the majority is interested in financial returns. The theoretical explanation of morality facilitates to identify the target group for socially responsible funds and shares. As the utility of morality and attitude towards the investment behavior are important, it can be assumed that a certain philanthropic and environmentally friendly lifestyle features investors' interests in socially responsible investment (see also Lewis et al., 1998) . The strong influence of subjective norms indicate that opinion leaders could play a crucial role by communicating social agreement. Finally, moral intensity and its subordinate factors could be highlighted in marketing strategies. Differently perceived magnitudes of consequences, probabilities of effect, temporal immediacies, proximities and concentrations of effect of the moral issue provoked higher or lower bids and are likely to influence investor decisions also outside the laboratory.
The current study shows that moral considerations influence investment behavior and examines the components of those moral considerations by comparing three theoretical models. For socially responsible investment, not only economic rationality in terms of profitability but also morality influences behavior. Morals and money may not always mix well; but investors in socially responsible shares at least try to make them mix and are prepared to pay a higher price for the sake of morality. assigns jobs almost exclusively internally. Everyone, independently of training, has the possibility to be promoted to, e.g., manager. In the industry sector, the engagement of company B for equal opportunities is exemplary.
Instructions and company descriptions
[Company C] The celebration of the 60-year existence of company C is overshadowed by the fact that a European Union commission has put the company on a black list for discriminating its older employees. Employees older than 45 years are not found in company C. Purportedly, the company does not appreciate older employees' experience.
According to rumors, company C lays off employees when they reach the age of 45 whenever legally possible. In the industry sector, the practice of company C concerning older employees is not future-oriented. (Jones, 1991; p.379) 
